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ABSTRACT: Radical left parties (RLPs) are a diverse lot and several RLP subtypes have 
been distinguished in the literature. However, the degree to which these subtypes are 
associated with significantly different policy proposals has not been analysed. At the same 
time, little is known about whether these predicated subtypes are associated with differences 
in their voters’ characteristics. In this article, we analyse the policy positions of RLPs across 
a number of issues using manifesto and expert survey data, allowing us to assess the nature of 
the differentiation between types of RLPs. We find that RLPs differ in the extent to which 
they adopt New Politics issues, and we propose a classification of Traditional and New Left 
RLPs. Using cross-national survey data coming from the European Election Studies series 
and multilevel multinomial models, we also examine the ideological, policy and social 
differences in the electorates of the various types of RLPs. We find socio-demographic and 
attitudinal differences between the voters of Traditional and New Left RLPs that are 
consistent with the programmatic differences of the parties.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
After some years struggling for their political significance, the political convulsions 
associated with the 2008 economic crisis have been accompanied by a growth in the support 
for some West European radical left parties (RLPs). These surges in radical left voting have 
benefitted parties of a variety of origins — such as Syriza in Greece (Synaspismós 
Rizospastikís Aristerás, Coalition of the Radical Left, initially a coalition around a party 
originated in a modernizer Communist split), the Socialist Party in the Netherlands 
(Socialistische Partij, with origins in a Maoist organization), or the Red-Green Unity List in 
Denmark (Enhedslisten — De Rød-Grønne, created by, among others, the small Danish 
Communist party). These developments have entailed the success of ideologically quite 
diverse RLPs, and sometimes two very different RLPs in the same country have taken ‘turns’ 
in benefitting from the turmoil at different points in time since the start of the crisis — as is 
the case of the Portuguese Communist Party, PCP (within the Democratic Unitarian 
Coalition, Coligação Democrática Unitária, CDU, that they dominate) and of the non-
Communist Left Block (Bloco de Esquerda, BE) in Portugal. However, in this context of 
renewed impetus and relevance, West European RLPs remain an under-researched party 
family.2   
 
The diversity in origins and ideological outlooks of West European RLPs are not surprising. 
Long-lasting divisions have marked the history of the West European left, with the Russian 
Revolution of 1917 triggering the possibly most relevant one. The October Revolution 
nurtured the appearance of the Communist version of Socialism, with the creation of a 
number of Communist parties across Europe (Sassoon 2010). This was the origin of an 
                                                          
2 See, however, March (2011) and Dunphy and Bale (2011). 
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enduring ideological division and of the Communist party family (von Beyme 1985). Some 
decades later, New Left and Left Socialist parties were created around the 1960s revolts. 
They departed ideologically from the more orthodox versions of both Social Democrat 
reformism and Communist Socialism, proposing an alternative Democratic Socialism and 
assuming the New Politics agenda (Lane and Ersson 1987, Gallagher et al. 1995). Even if 
they were not the only divisions experienced by the Western left (as the Trotskyite and 
Maoist ruptures attest), the Communist and New Left/Left Socialist waves of party formation 
generated RLPs that have been present in many West European polities since long.  
 
What some have identified as Communist and Left Socialist party families (Klingemann 
2005), have experienced important transformations and upheavals over time. One of the most 
important such episodes took place around the crisis of Soviet Socialism at the end of the 
1980s and beginning of the 1990s, entailing a transformation in the nature of many Western 
Communist parties (WCPs) (Bull and Heywood 1994, Botella and Ramiro 2003, Moreau and 
Courtois 2014). Several of them changed their strategies and even their identity, transforming 
into post-Communist Democratic Socialist parties, and giving a new twist to the diversity of 
RLPs. The ideological evolution of the Communist and radical left post-Communist parties 
blurred the boundaries between the old Communist and Left Socialist families, and led to the 
formation of a new and distinct RLP family (Hudson 2000 and 2012, March 2011, De Waele 
and Seiler 2012, Escalona and Vieira 2013).  
 
This historical trajectory leads to the inherent heterogeneity of contemporary RLPs and to the 
distinction between different subsets of parties within the new party family. Accordingly, this 
article has two core aims: to examine and measure the diversity in the programmatic appeals 
of West European RLPs, and to analyse whether this diversity is mirrored by the composition 
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of their electorates. Therefore, we address two main questions: Are RLPs significantly 
heterogeneous in terms of their programmatic appeals? If they are, thus appealing to different 
ideological and policy priorities, does the social background and attitudinal features of the 
voters also differ across RLPs subtypes? In addressing these questions, we explore the match 
between party supply and electoral ‘demand’ and we, thus, contribute to the task of 
specification and refinement of the party family category for the case of Western European 
RLPs, in line with Mair and Mudde’s (1998) recommendations.  
 
We first describe the varieties of West European RLPs as portrayed in the literature and 
present our expectations regarding their differentiation in terms of programmatic appeals and 
voters’ profiles. Then we present the data and methods we use in our analyses. The fourth 
section proposes a classification of RLPs based on their policy positions, and the fifth section 
explores the heterogeneity of RLPs voters based on the previous classification. Finally, we 
conclude with a summary of our findings and suggestions for future research. 
 
 
VARIETIES OF WEST EUROPEAN RADICAL LEFT PARTIES 
 
There is a general consensus around the identification of RLPs that pervades most recent 
approaches to this party family. Following March’s (2011: 8) description, RLPs reject the 
‘socio-economic structure of contemporary capitalism and its values and practices (…) They 
advocate alternative economic and power structures involving a major redistribution of 
resources’. In this sense, RLPs advocate a transformative and systemic change, rejecting neo-
liberal market-oriented policies (Dunphy 2004: 2). Their version of anti-capitalism is better 
described as a criticism of the current globalized capitalism than as a clear characterisation of 
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an alternative Socialist system — something that is, instead, difficult to find in most of their 
current discourses, with a few exceptions. Their proposal of a radical change refers not only 
to the economy but also to some key features of contemporary political systems, proposing 
participatory practices that complement representative democracy (March 2011: 9). These 
parties’ self-definition places them to the left of the Social Democrats and Greens. In EU 
member-states, some of them are part of the Party of the European Left (PEL), while others 
are integrated in the group of the European United Left-Nordic Green Left in the European 
Parliament but are not part of PEL.3  
 
Despite the wide agreement around the characterization of RLPs, the degree to which they 
respond to this general portrayal is mixed. While the differentiation between this party 
grouping and other adjacent party families — such as the Social Democrats and Greens — 
has been reinforced by the ideological moderation of the latter, the way in which RLPs 
effectively express an anti-capitalist discourse is variable. This differentiation in types of 
anti-capitalism may be the reflection of these parties showing dissimilar shades of left-wing 
radicalism. Thus, a distinction can be established between more ‘traditional’ anti-capitalist 
RLPs — such as those still associated with Communist ideals, like the Communist Party of 
Greece (Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas, KKE) and the Portuguese Communist Party — and 
more ideologically ‘modernized’ parties — such as the Danish Socialist People’s Party 
(Socialistik Folkeparti, SF) before joining the Green family. 
 
This distinction between ideologically traditional and modernized RLPs has been used since 
long to differentiate between the New Left/New Politics non-orthodox Left Socialist parties 
formed in the 1960s and 1970s (Gallagher et al. 1995), on the one side, and the allegedly 
                                                          
3 Still others participate in coordination bodies of Communist parties. 
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traditional Communist parties, on the other. It also resonates in the descriptions of the 
different paths taken by WCPs reacting to their organizational and electoral crisis during the 
1980s and 1990s. In those years, it was possible to place WCPs in a continuum between two 
extreme positions represented, on the one hand, by those parties implementing deep processes 
of party transformation that drove them out of the traditional Communist identity and, on the 
other, those parties that decided to remain loyal to their classical ideological principles 
(Botella and Ramiro 2003).4 Among those that remained in the field of the radical left some 
substituted Communism with a combination of Democratic Socialism and New Politics 
policy priorities (e.g. feminism, pacifism, environmentalism, minority rights) — as the 
Swedish Left Party (Vänsterpartiet, V) did — while others reaffirmed their Communist 
principles more or less assertively — as in the case of French and Portuguese Communists.  
 
These changes and evolutions are still visible in the contemporary RLP family, giving birth to 
different strands of the West European radical left. Backes and Moreau (2008) identify three 
types of contemporary RLPs: traditionalist Marxist-Leninist, reform Communists, and red-
green parties. This typology is based on a combination of party origin and party ideology 
features. The first two categories include more or less ideologically traditional parties that did 
not break  — at least not completely  with the Communist identity, while the third one 
includes non-Communist radical left and Democratic Socialist parties assuming New Left or 
New Politics issues (feminism, environmentalism, participatory democracy, minority rights, 
etc.).  
 
                                                          
4 At the time, some WCPs abandoned the RLP family and entered the Social Democratic camp — such as the 
Democratic Party of the Left (Partito Democratico della Sinistra, PDS), successor party of the Italian 
Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI) — while others moved towards the Green party family — 
such as the Dutch and Catalan communists, through their participation in Green Left (Groen Links, GL) and 
Initiative for Catalonia Greens (Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds, ICV), respectively. 
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March’s (2011: 16) recent classification of RLPs into Communists, Democratic Socialists, 
Populist Socialists and Social Populists is, instead, based on an approximation to parties’ 
ideology rather than on their origin. In March’s (2011: 18-19) view, Communists are grouped 
around their allegiance to traditional symbols and Marxist ideology; Democratic Socialists 
combine Socialist socio-economic claims with policies from the New Left agenda; Populist 
Socialists add to the traditional left-wing socio-economic policies an emphasis on anti-
establishment discourse; and, finally, Social Populists develop further the anti-mainstream 
discourse of the Populist Socialists by mixing left-wing appeals with others that do not 
belong to the catalogue of left-wing politics.5 
 
However, as March recognizes, this classification confronts several problems. Although the 
categories try to group parties that are ideologically similar, they still vary in radicalism and 
ideological traditionalism within each of the categories. Communist parties differ in their 
degree of attachment to their classical ideology, and additional subcategories of Conservative 
versus Reform Communists are added by March (2011) to try to differentiate between the 
most traditionalist parties and those adopting New Left issues. Democratic Socialist parties 
also differ in their degree of radicalism (as illustrated by the de-radicalization process 
experienced by the Danish SF). In March’s (2011) own view, the RLP family constitutes an 
ideologically eclectic one combining different modalities of left-wing radicalism, Democratic 
Socialist ideals, Eco-Socialism, New Politics, and populism.6 Additionally, the dynamic 
                                                          
5 Social Populists are, according to March, only found in central and Eastern Europe. 
6 Applied to the current RLPs, these categories overlap to some degree. An additional problem is that changes in 
parties’ strategies and processes of party transformation force to conceive the classification of parties as a 
dynamic process (March 2011: 19). Following March’s (2011) categorisation (for Western Europe), the 
Communist subtype includes the Cypriot (Progressive Party of Working People, Anorthotikó Kómma 
Ergazómenou Laoú, AKEL), French (French Communist Party, Parti communiste français, PCF), Greek 
(KKE), Portuguese (PCP), Italian (Communist Refoundation Party, Partito della Rifondazione Comunista, PRC 
and Party of the Italian Communists, Partito dei Comunisti Italiani, PdCI) and Spanish (Communist Party of 
Spain, Partido Comunista de España, PCE, integrated after 1986 in Izquierda Unida, IU, United Left) 
Communist parties. The Democratic Socialist subtype includes almost all other RLPs: the Greek Synaspismos 
(Coalition of Left, of Movements and Ecology, antecedent organization of Syriza), the Finnish Left Alliance 
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nature of parties’ strategies make some of the categories appear void at some points in time or 
not very illuminating at others, as parties change their stances. Particularly, the Populist 
Socialist category is left without cases due to transformations in the two parties that 
populated it  the Dutch Socialist Party and the German The Left  and which, according 
to March (2011), are increasingly difficult to differentiate from other parties classified as 
Democratic Socialists.7 At the same time, this category is probably not too useful due to the 
blurring boundaries of radical left populism, with many RLPs increasingly using anti-
establishment appeals.8 
 
In this context, an empirical approach that clarifies the usefulness of these categories, 
explores the way in which parties’ policy proposals indeed allow distinguishing between 
different subsets of RLPs, and assesses if the heterogeneity in parties’ programmatic appeals 
is associated with heterogeneity in parties’ voters characteristics is needed. Thus, we analyse 
RLPs’ policy positions in order to determine the degree to which they are homogeneous or, 
instead, require the differentiation of subtypes.  
 
If the categories differentiating between subtypes of RLPs  and, especially, distinguishing 
between those considered ideologically more traditional (such as the Communists) and those 
ideologically more modernized (such as the Democratic Socialist and New Left parties) in 
March’s (2011) terms  stand, we expect them to be reflected in differences in their 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(VAS, Vasemmistoliito), the Portuguese Left Bloc, the Swedish Left Party, the Danish Red-Green Alliance (EL) 
and the Socialist People’s Party, the Norwegian Socialist Left Party (Socialistik Ventreparti, SV), and the 
Luxembourgish The Left (Déi Lénk). Finally, the Populist Socialist subtype includes the German The Left (Die 
Linke) and the Dutch Socialist Party  although only temporarily  and two smaller parties, the Irish Socialist 
Party and the French New Anti-Capitalist Party (Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste). 
7 See also Pauwels (2014). 
8 Although it could be vindicated after the arrival of new left-wing populist organizations such as the Spanish 
We Can, Podemos since 2014. 
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programmatic stances. Given that both subgroups are part of the same RLP family the 
differences cannot be expected to be very large. The main anticipation regarding 
programmatic differentiation is that, besides the common emphasis on traditional left-wing 
policies, Democratic Socialist and New Left parties will give more prominence to New 
Politics issues. 
 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
The empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. In order to determine the degree of 
heterogeneity among RLPs we first explore their policy positions. Then, we develop an 
empirically informed classification of RLPs in order to assess whether there are significant 
differences between voters of different types of RLPs. The criteria employed to define 
whether a party belongs to the RLP family or not follow the academic consensus regarding 
this party family (Hudson 2000 and 2012; March 2011). Table 1 contains the name of the 
parties that, following the specialized literature, we identify as Radical Left in Western 
Europe, among those that are covered by either of our sources of information  the 
Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES).  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
In order to explore the degree of programmatic heterogeneity among RLPs, we employ two 
different sources of data. First, we use CMP data (Volkens et al. 2013). Party manifestos are 
a relatively comprehensive and authoritative summary of the issues and policy positions that 
parties want to strategically emphasise, and have been found to reasonably anticipate their 
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future policy action if they reach office (cf., e.g., Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge 1994).9 
The CMP uses manual coding of party manifestos divided in quasi-sentences, with each 
sentence assigned to a pre-designed list of codes that reflect a wide range of possible policy 
positions or areas. Once the whole manifesto is coded, the percentage of quasi-sentences 
referring to each code is computed. Thus, the focus is on emphasis/salience, even if spatial 
positions are often derived from a subset of the codes (cf. Budge et al. 2001). The CMP is the 
most comprehensive source to derive the position of political parties over time in democratic 
countries after World War II.  
 
The use of CMP data is not without shortcomings. Among the most frequently highlighted 
are issues of data validity, reliability (Pennings and Keman 2002, Benoit and Laver 2007, 
Mikhaylov et al. 2012), and of comparability across parties, countries and types of texts 
(Gabel and Huber 2000; Benoit et al. 2012; Gemenis 2012). For the specific case of RLPs, an 
additional problem is that the way the traditional left-right scale is extracted with the CMP 
data relies on dimensional analyses that are very dependent on the distribution of parties used 
to identify the items that form the left-right scale. As RLPs manifestos — and for that matter 
those of other small parties — are few in number and not systematically coded (depending on 
their electoral ups and downs), the resulting left-right scale will not capture items that are 
important in properly calibrating their positions and movements along the continuum.10 Some 
evidence of this is found in the representations of party movements over time that suggest, for 
                                                          
9 However, party manifestos are not the only authoritative source to identify the ideological positions of a given 
party. Many parties adopt policy positions and programmes at their regular party conferences, which might 
differ or be more detailed than their party manifestos. In choosing the electoral manifestos we highlight the 
strategic choices made by parties when publicly (re)presenting their ideological positions and policy 
commitments. 
10 Indeed, the inconsistency found in the results of Adams et al. (2011) and Adams et al. (2012) in relation to 
partisan sorting of ‘niche’ party voters depending on whether movements are measured with party manifestos or 
expert surveys might well be related to this problem of differential adequacy of the left-right positioning of 
CMP data for the more extreme and smaller parties.  
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example, that Communist parties have been leapfrogged by the Socialists/Social democrats in 
France and Sweden, and even by the Liberals in Sweden (Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge 
1994, McDonald and Budge 2005), or that there are no significant differences in left-right 
positions between RLPs and the Socialists/Social democrats in a number of countries  — e.g. 
France, Norway and Portugal (McDonald and Budge 2005: 74-75).  
 
For this reason, we contrast the information provided by CMP data with a much shorter time-
series of party positions provided by the CHES between 1999 and 2010 (Bakker et al. 2012), 
which contain estimations of party positions on different issues for European Union 
countries. Expert data are not free from problems either, as the judgment of experts is 
arguably ‘stickier’ over time than observational data based on party manifestos, thus reducing 
the possibility of detecting short-term strategic movements by parties. Additionally, there is 
no single time-series of expert surveys that covers the range of countries, parties and years 
covered by manifesto data. Expert surveys give information on party positions basing their 
estimates on sources of evidence wider than manifesto analyses, so attempts to validate the 
result of one analysis with those from another must consider this limitation (Meyer 2013: 31). 
We do not aim at validating the estimates from both sources of data, but relying on both the 
CMP and the CHES allows using consistency in positions as a criterion for the classification 
of different RLPs.  
 
In order to determine whether subtypes of RLPs can be identified, we analyse CMP data 
since the late 1940s with factor analysis11 on a number of issues that are deemed to be, 
                                                          
11 Factor analysis is arguably the most widely used technique for analysing CMP data (e.g.Bakker and Hobolt 
2013, Helbling and Tresch 2011, Hooghe et al. 2010, McDonald et al. 2007). Van der Brug (2001), however, 
argues that multidimensional scaling is more suitable for the study of party manifestos. Whilst we acknowledge 
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empirically and theoretically, relevant for the study of RLPs, thus refraining from the use of 
the CMP left-right scale for the aforementioned reasons.12 Regarding CHES data, this article 
will focus on a variable containing expert judgements on the position of parties on the New 
Politics dimension (green/alternative/libertarian vs. traditional/authoritarian/nationalist). 
 
The second part of the paper focuses on RLP voters and utilizes data from the five waves of 
the European Election Studies (EES) that are currently available: 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 and 
2009.13 These surveys have the advantage of measuring key questions over time since the 
collapse of Soviet Socialism in a fairly homogenised manner. They enable us to explore 
whether voters of different kinds of RLPs have different profiles, or whether differences at 
the level of the parties do not reflect on their voters.  
 
The analyses in the second empirical part of the article will be restricted to those countries 
included in the EES (i.e. member states at the time of the respective EP election) and for 
which the EES questionnaires included at least one RLP among the parties that respondents 
voted for in the previous national elections. These are typically, with few exceptions, RLPs 
that had parliamentary representation during the period of study, either in the national or in 
the European parliament. Thus, the countries included in these analyses are Cyprus, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
van der Brug’s (2001) contribution, we employ factor analysis because multidimensional scaling is extremely 
sensitive to the presence of a few outliers (Cox and Cox 2001, p.96). In fact, although our findings do not 
change substantively when we use multidimensional scaling instead of factor analysis, we have noticed that the 
proportion of the variance explained by each dimension changes dramatically with the removal of a single 
outlier. 
12 We have excluded from all the analyses cases for which manifesto data were not available and the 
corresponding values had been estimated by the CMP team. 
13 Other sources were considered but discarded because they did not provide data for an equivalently long span 
of time or an equivalently wide range of countries.  
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Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.14  
 
Based on the findings in the first part of the empirical analysis, a variable identifying 
different categories of RLPs is created and used as the outcome variable in our analysis of 
voting behaviour. As we will show, the variable includes two categories of RLPs (Traditional 
vs. New Left), and so the outcome variable classifies respondents according to whether they 
voted, at the last national election, for (1) a Traditional RLP, (2) a New Left RLP or (3) any 
other party. Regarding the right-hand side of the equation, the following correlates are 
examined: age, gender, education, urbanization, religious affiliation, working class 
identification, union membership, left-right self-placement, dissatisfaction with democracy, 
and opinion on EU membership. Most of these variables have been found to have an effect on 
the probability to vote for a RLP (Ramiro 2014).  
 
The models are estimated with multilevel multinomial regressions.15 Random effects by 
country are estimated to take into account the clustered nature of the data (i.e. voters 
clustered within countries). While the two types of RLPs that we finally identify (Traditional 
and New Left) compete with each other in some countries, in others there is only either a 
traditional RLP or a New Left RLP. As the probability of choosing between a Traditional or a 
New Left RLP varies across countries, the country-level random effects cannot possibly be 
                                                          
14 As in Arzheimer and Carter (2006), excluding countries without the parties we study in Parliament does not 
involve selection bias, as our goal is not to explain the success of RLPs across societies but to focus on 
heterogeneity among RLP voters. 
15 Using multinomial regression instead of logistic regression will enable readers to see comparisons not just 
between supporters of different types of RLP, but also between supporters of the radical left and supporters of 
other parties.  
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the same for the three categories of the outcome variable. For this reason, the model will 
allow for random effects to be different for each category of the dependent variable.16 
 
The next section presents the results of the first part of the empirical analysis, where we focus 
on the policy positions of different RLPs. The results of the analysis of voting behaviour will 
then be presented in the following one.  
 
CLASSIFYING THE RADICAL LEFT 
The aim of this section is to analyse whether RLPs differ on the basis of their proposals and 
ideological statements. Unlike previous classifications, we rely on empirical data on policy 
and political positions in an attempt to create an empirically-informed classification of RLPs.  
 
We start with an exploratory analysis of CMP data on RLPs since 1945. While the CMP 
contains information on a large number of issues, not all of them are suitable to identify 
RLPs. There is a debate as to whether RLPs should be considered ‘niche’ parties or not. 
Mostly, the disagreements relate to the underlying constitutive characteristic of ‘niche’ 
parties and whether they are identified on the basis of having ‘distinct’ issue focuses or on the 
basis of having ‘extreme’ positions (see Meguid 2005, Adams et al. 2006, Ezrow 2010, 
Wagner 2012a and 2012b, Bischof forthcoming). We agree with Bischof (forthcoming) that, 
in most cases, RLPs focus on the same core socio-economic issues that articulate competition 
between mainstream parties, albeit adopting more extreme positions than the latter. 
                                                          
16 We have used the gsem (generalized structural equation modelling) command in Stata 13. We also allow for 
co-variation between the random effects because the latent exogenous variables that determine the choices that 
voters face may not be independent from each other (e.g. the existence of different types of radical left party 
might be less likely in countries where one particular type – say, a New Left RLP – is very successful). 
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Nevertheless, as Bischof (forthcoming) shows, some issues are mentioned (or not) to the 
same extent by parties of different party families, and so they are unlikely to offer much 
insight about the peculiarities and internal differences among RLPs.  
For this reason, we selected issues following two criteria: one empirical and one theoretical. 
Firstly, following a similar logic to Bischof’s (forthcoming), and using the CMP data for 
RLPs since the 1940s, we selected all issues that are mentioned more often by RLPs than by 
other party families, provided that the difference was statistically significant and that the ratio 
between the mentions by RLPs and those by other parties was 1.5 or larger. Secondly, all 
items that could be theoretically classified as post-materialist issues were selected as well. 
We, thus, follow an inductive approach driven by the dimensionality of manifesto statements 
(cf. Robertson 1976, Gabel and Huber 2000), complemented with our expert knowledge 
about the issues that are of additional relevance for RLPs formation and change. This resulted 
in 19 different CMP issue variables that are summarized in Table 2. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
With these 19 items, we explored the dimensionality of the policy positions of RLPs since the 
1940s using factor analysis. As the goal of this article is to explore ideological/programmatic 
heterogeneity among RLPs, parties belonging to other families were excluded from these 
analyses.17 This allows us to characterize and map the differences among RLPs without the 
contamination of issue positioning of other party families. 
The results from the factor analysis show a two dimensional solution with one dimension 
clearly stronger than the other (Eigenvalues of 1.66 and 1.05, respectively). Τable 3 shows 
the factor loadings of each of the 19 items on each dimension, and a screeplot of the 
                                                          
17 Moreover, the nature of our selection of issues means that these are issue topics that are more likely 
mentioned by left-wing parties and, hence, adding other non-RLP parties would only capture the left-right 
distinction again.  
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Eigenvalues is provided in the Appendix (Figure A1). The items with higher factor loadings 
on the first dimension are positive mentions of internationalism and environmentalism, both 
issues associated with the New Politics agenda. Following those but with considerably 
smaller factor loadings is the item on anti-growth economy, which can also be categorised as 
a New Politics issue. The second dimension seems much weaker and less clear than the first 
one, with considerably lower factor loadings. The emphasis on anti-imperialism, foreign 
special relations and democracy are among those items with high loadings, followed (with 
lower loadings) by a negative relation to positive emphasis to the military. It seems as if this 
second dimension is related to the rhetoric of old communist parties emphasising the struggle 
against imperialism and for peoples' democracy.18  
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
In order to better evaluate the location of different RLPs deriving from the analyses of these 
issues, Figure 1 plots them according to their position on each dimension shown in Table 3. 
Although our dimensional analyses include parties and manifestos since the 1940s, to 
facilitate visualization, only the positions for party manifestoes from 1989 onwards are 
shown, as this corresponds with the period examined with survey data in the second part of 
the paper. 
 
Three aspects stand out in Figure 1. First, the New Politics dimension displays more variance 
than the second dimension (which we have called anti-imperialist orthodoxy), as was already 
evident from the eigenvalues. This means that RLPs are more likely to differ in their 
positions around New Politics issues than around anti-imperialist orthodoxy. Second, the 
                                                          
18 Note that this item does not necessarily refer to liberal democracy. It also includes positive mentions to 
democracy as an abstract concept, to direct democracy, or to democracy as the goal to achieve in international 
organizations or elsewhere.  
 17 
correlation between both dimensions, which is negligible when the whole period is taken into 
account,19 clearly increases after 1989. Given that high positive values on the anti-imperialist 
orthodoxy dimension denote a lack of anti-imperialist rhetoric, this correlation indicates that 
parties that can be categorised as New Left after 1989 are less likely to use the traditional 
anti-imperialist rhetoric in their manifestoes.20 Third, despite the amount of variation, many 
RLPs do not have a very distinct position and are located in the middle of the cloud. Given 
that we are analysing parties of the same family, it would be surprising if this were not the 
case.  
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The results are consistent with what one could expect based on previous categorizations in 
the literature on RLPs. The high anti-imperialist orthodoxy/low New Politics quadrant is 
dominated by parties previously characterized as traditional in their values, such as the KKE 
and the PCP. By contrast, the low anti-imperialist orthodoxy/high New Politics space is 
dominated by the Nordic RLP, such as Iceland's Ab (currently, VG - Left-Wing Movement), 
the Norwegian Socialist Left Party (SV) or the Swedish Left Party (V).  
 
Given the weakness of the second dimension, together with the high correlation between both 
dimensions for the period that we are most interested in, there are reasons to argue that RLPs 
differ mainly on their position regarding New Politics issues. In order to check the robustness 
of these results, we employed the CHES, available for EU countries. Figure 2 shows the 
position of parties on two axes: New Politics (vertical axis) — the dimension we are 
                                                          
19 The correlation is 0.002. 
20 Note that the left-right position of RLPs is only weakly related to their position regarding New Politics issues. 
The correlation between the New Politics dimension and the CMP left-right scale is -0.11 and only significant at 
p<0.1. The Anti-imperialist orthodoxy dimension and the CMP left-right scale correlate only a bit more (-0.3), 
suggesting that this is a rhetoric that can be found more often among RLPs with more centrist scores on the left-
right CMP scale. 
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interested in — and economic left-right position (horizontal axis).21 The New Politics 
dimension is measured with the GAL/TAN index, ranging from 0 
(Green/Alternative/Libertarian) to 10 (Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist).  
 
 [FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
As with CMP data, the results emphasise that the largest source of variation among RLPs is 
their positions on the New Politics dimension. This is a non-trivial finding, as there were no 
reasons to expect that they might not differ as much in their economic left-right positions. 
Reassuringly, many of the placements of the individual parties are consistent with those 
obtained with the CMP data. New Politics RLPs are closer to the bottom side of the graph in 
Figure 2 (scores closer to zero). As can be appreciated, parties such as the KKE — 
categorized as a Traditional RLP according to the CMP data — are also located at the 
traditional extreme in the CHES, while others such as the Swedish Left Party (V) are 
consistently on the New Left/New Politics side. Nevertheless, the positioning of several 
parties in Figure 2 differs somewhat from their location in Figure 1. This is the case of the 
PCP, which in the CHES is on the New Politics side under the label of their electoral 
umbrella CDU, which consists of the PCP and its allied party PEV (Ecologist Party - The 
Greens).  
 
In order to address these disparities in classification with each data source, we propose a 
classification that distinguishes between New Left/New Politics RLPs and other RLPs  
which we will refer to as Traditional RLPs  based on the joint consideration of both the 
                                                          
21 The correlation between both dimensions in the CHES is -0.18 and statistically insignificant. 
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CMP and the CHES data. For this, we examined the distribution of RLPs first according to 
their factor loadings in the CMP analysis, and then according to their score in the GAL/TAN 
index of the CHES. Using the distribution in the CMP factor, only RLPs with values equal or 
higher than the value corresponding to the 3rd percentile were classified as New Politics 
parties. Using the GAL/TAN index, only those RLPs on the New Politics side of the scale 
(that is, those scoring less than 5) were classified as New Left/New Politics RLPs. Following 
the examination of the list of parties that fell under the New Politics category for each source, 
we classified as New Left parties only those that either (1) could be categorised as New Left 
on the basis of both the CMP and the CHES data, or (2) information on those parties was 
missing in the CHES, but their manifestos could be consistently categorised as New Left 
during the period of interest (1989 or later) according to the CMP data. This allows us to 
identify those cases for which there is less uncertainty about the fact that they are indeed 
closer to the New Left ideal type in terms of their programmatic and ideological positions.  
 
Table 4 shows the classification that results from this combination of information from party 
manifestos and expert surveys.22 Our empirically informed classification of RLPs is partially 
consistent with the positions that parties are assigned in the literature (e.g. March 2011) and 
adds information on parties that are not usually considered in previous typologies (as the 
Icelandic, Irish and Luxemburgish ones). Parties such as the Portuguese Left Bloc (BE), the 
German Left Party, the Spanish United Left (IU), the Swedish Left (V), or the Finish Left 
Wing Alliance (VAS) are classified as New Left/New Politics. In contrast, the Communist 
parties of Greece (KKE), Portugal (PCP), and France (PCF) cannot be considered as New 
Left parties. The main difference with classifications proposed by other scholars (highlighted 
                                                          
22 More detailed information about classification by source, party and election year can be found in the 
Appendix (Table A2). 
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in grey shade) is the identification of the Spanish IU (formed by the PCE) and of other 
Communist parties such as  the Italian PdCI and the Communist Refoundation Party as New 
Left (consistently so in both the CMP and the CHES data). The opposite happens with EL in 
Denmark, SP in the Netherlands, and Syriza/Synaspismos in Greece, which were not 
consistently on the New Left side in both datasets and therefore, unlike previous 
classifications, are included in the Traditional RLP category. In any case, these three latter 
cases can be considered as ‘border-line’ ones, particularly because there is no consistent 
pattern between the CMP and the CHES data. 
 
Another aspect that our results and classification highlights is that some parties change over 
time in their adoption of New Politics issues. Many parties start embracing New Left 
platforms only in the late 1980s and early 1990s — mostly Scandinavian, but also south 
European parties — and in some cases new parties are formed also in these same years 
through splits or mergers that embrace from the start New Left positions.  
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
With this classification, in the next section we turn to the analysis of the differences (if any) 
in socio-demographic and attitudinal profiles between the voters of the Traditional and New 
Left parties. The expectation is that parties with different programmatic and ideological 
appeals should attract voters that will differ in a number of aspects. Primarily, we expect that 
the voters of New Left parties — roughly corresponding to the Democratic Socialist type for 
March (2011) — should resemble in the gender, age and educational attainment composition 
the voter profile of Left-libertarian parties (Kitschelt 1988, 1989). This implies that they will 
be younger, more balanced in terms of gender composition, with higher levels of educational 
achievement, and less likely to be members of the working class and union members. Finally, 
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regarding basic socio-political attitudes, we do not have clear-cut expectations regarding left-
right placement, religious adscription, opinions about EU membership, or satisfaction with 
democracy (cf. Ramiro 2014 for a characterization of RLPs voters in general). Although there 
is variation across parties, both Traditional and New Left RLPs tend to have critical positions 
towards the EU and towards (institutionalized) religion, and both are also critical of liberal 
democracy.    
 
 
RADICAL LEFT VOTERS 
 
As mentioned in the Data and Methods section, we employ the EES between 1989 and 2009 
for our individual-level analyses of the profile of RLP voters.23 `Our study in this section is 
limited to EU member states at the time of the respective EP elections. This means that we do 
not have data for Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, and that our data for Cyprus, Finland and 
Sweden are limited to a few years only. We use multilevel multinomial logistic regression 
models in order to examine the heterogeneity among radical left voters, while accounting for 
the clustered nature of the data. We compare the voters of Traditional RLPs with those of 
other non-RLPs and with the voters of New Left RLPs. Although the comparison to the 
voters of other parties is also interesting and provides a baseline to interpret our findings, here 
we focus on the comparison between the two types of RLPs we have distinguished. The 
distribution of respondents across the three categories in the pooled dataset is presented in 
Table A1 in the Appendix. 
                                                          
23 Information about the elections and parties covered with the data can be found in the Appendix (Table A2). 
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The results of the multinomial regression model with the pooled dataset of the EES for all 
countries and years between 1989 and 2009 are shown in Table A3 (in the Appendix). In 
order to facilitate the interpretation of findings, Figure 3 presents the predicted probabilities 
of supporting Traditional and New Left RLPs for those variables with statistically significant 
effects: ideology, education, dissatisfaction with democracy, religion and opinions on EU 
membership.  
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The results presented in Figure 3 and Table A3 suggest that there are, indeed, a number of 
interesting differences between the voters of Traditional and New Left RLPs. Many of them 
are in the expected direction, but others depart from the expectations. As a reminder, we 
expected that New Left RLP voters would resemble the stereotypical profile of Left-
libertarian party voters: younger, more educated, middle class, secular, urban dwellers and 
relatively balanced in terms of gender. The picture that emerges from our findings does not 
depart too much from this stereotype, but it differs in certain respects. First, New Left RLP 
voters are no different from voters of Traditional RLPs when it comes to age and gender. 
Secondly, they are not more likely to be urban dwellers. Finally, they do not differ from 
Traditional RLPs voters in their class identification or union linkage either.  
 
In other aspects, however, our findings are in line with the expectations of resemblance to the 
electorate of Left-libertarian and Green parties: New Left RLPs are more successful among 
the more educated voters than among the least educated ones, in contrast with the findings for 
Traditional RLPs, which still have a considerable support base among the least educated. 
Moreover, although both types are more successful attracting non-religious than religious 
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voters, the proportion of non-religious supporters is 1.6 times larger among New Left RLPs’ 
voters, and thus New Left RLP voters are more secularised. This may be explained by 
postmaterialists’ rejection of traditional, hierarchical religious institutions (Inglehart and 
Appel 1989).  
 
The expectations that we had in terms of the ideological make-up of the voters of Traditional 
and New Left RLPs are not confirmed by the results. We expected few ideological 
differences in the left-right scale; yet, we find that New Left RLP voters are somewhat more 
centrist in relative terms. In fact, this is consistent with the results obtained at the party level 
through the CHES, according to which Traditional RLPs score on average 1.18 on the 0-10 
left-right scale based on economic issues (LRECON) and New Left RLPs score 1.45.24  
 
Lastly, we also find significant attitudinal differences between the two types of RLP voters. 
Although we had no clear expectations in relation to attitudes towards democracy and the 
EU, voters of New Left RLPs are less Eurosceptic than those of Traditional RLPs, as they are 
considerably less likely to hold negative views of the EU than Traditional RLP voters. This is 
consistent with significant differences in the degree of opposition to the EU between the two 
types of RLPs in the CHES, which indicate that opposition to the EU is somewhat lower 
among New Left RLPs (1.1 points less than Traditional RLPs on an 11-point scale).25 
Moreover, consistently with a post-materialist perspective, although dissatisfaction with 
democracy considerably increases the chances of supporting both types of RLPs, dissatisfied 
voters constitute a significantly greater proportion of New Left RLPs voters.  
 
                                                          
24 The difference is, however, only significant at p<0.1. 
25 These differences are significant at p<0.01. 
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Overall, thus, our findings suggest that Traditional and New Left RLP voters are sufficiently 
distinct in a number of socio-demographic and attitudinal traits. This lends support to the 
expectation that the programmatic differentiation that is visible at the level of the party 
supply corresponds to the social coalitions that the parties are able to forge among the 
electorate (the political/electoral ‘demand’). However, our expectation regarding a greater 
socio-demographic resemblance between New Left RLPs and Green/Left-libertarian voters 
was only partly confirmed because New Left and Traditional RLPs voters are only 
significantly different in terms of their educational attainment. In the final section, we reflect 
on the implications of these findings and point to future directions of this research agenda.  
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Despite being part of the same party family, West European RLPs are not all the same. In 
fact, there have been several attempts to develop a number of typologies of RLPs in the 
literature based on their varied origins and ideology (Backes and Moreau 2008, March 2011, 
Escalona and Vieira 2013). However, the degree to which different subtypes of RLPs show 
substantial differences in their policy proposals has not been analysed so far in a systematic 
way. This article has contributed to the literature that further addresses the ideological and 
electoral competition complexities of certain party families (see also Margulies 2014 on 
Liberal parties) by addressing two interrelated questions that increase our understanding of 
the match between party supply (policy positions) and demand (citizens’ positions and 
characteristics). First, to what extent are RLPs different in terms of their programmatic 
appeals? And, if they are, do these differences also reflect on their voters’ profiles?  
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With regard to the first question, we analyzed the policy stances of RLPs employing party 
manifesto data from the CMP and expert judgments from the CHES. Both data sources point 
to a similar conclusion: while RLPs share many similarities, there are also systematic 
differences in some of the policies that they stand for. In line with our expectations, we found 
that most of the variation among RLPs is explained in terms of their position regarding New 
Politics issues. Thus, while some RLPs have completely embraced the New Politics/New Left 
discourse and combine radical left-wing economic policies with strong environmentalism, 
pacifism and opposition to traditional morality, others prefer to stick (albeit to different 
degrees) to the classical radical left discourse. Based on these findings, we categorized RLPs 
into two subtypes: those that can be consistently considered as New Left RLPs in both data 
sources, and those that can not (which we labelled as Traditional RLPs). 
 
Our findings are partially consistent with previous typologies of RLPs proposed in the 
literature in that all of them include the New Politics/New Left component in some of their 
categories. In contrast with previous classifications, some of the parties that were consistently 
found in the New Politics area in our analyses still remain loyal to the Communist identity, 
even though their policy stances suggest that they no longer are Traditional RLPs in terms of 
their positions. March (2011), for example, classifies the two Italian Communist parties (PRC 
and PdCI) and the Spanish United Left as ‘Communist’, but they consistently appear as New 
Left in our examination. A factor analysis based on a number of party manifesto items did not 
identify any other underlying dimension that could be helpful in order to create additional 
subtypes of RLPs.   
 
The second part of the analysis examined the heterogeneity among voters of the Traditional 
and New Left RLPs using individual-level data from the EES. The findings show significant 
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differences between the voters of both subtypes. We expected voters of New Left RLPs to 
resemble Left-Libertarian and Green voters to a greater extent than voters of Traditional 
RLPs, but the results only confirm this expectation in some variables. We do not find 
differences regarding gender, age, subjective social class, union membership or degree of 
urbanization. However, compared to their Traditional counterparts there is a higher 
proportion of New Left RLPs who are highly educated and non-religious, consistent with our 
expectations. In terms of attitudes, contrary to our expectations, there are some significant 
differences too: voters of the New Left subtype are slightly more moderate ideologically than 
Traditional RLP voters; they are also less Eurosceptic and are more dissatisfied with 
democracy. 
 
Our findings have a number of implications in terms of research on RLPs, and possibly other 
parties, in Western Europe. One is related to the mechanics of congruence or responsiveness 
between party supply and electoral ‘demand’. Our study detects that, for RLPs, policy change 
seems to be often linked to party transformations — splits and mergers — such that new RLP 
organizations are created either to facilitate, or as a consequence of, the policy and 
ideological moves. The paradigmatic example is the case of the Italian PCI and its 
transformation into PDS, but we can find many other examples, some of which entailed 
remaining in the RLP family (e.g. IU in Spain, VAS in Finland, BE in Portugal), and others 
that implied tilting towards the Green party family (e.g. Groen Links in the Netherlands or 
ICV in Catalonia). Until recently, thus, RLPs seemed to respond to changes in electoral 
‘demand’ by organizational transformation and ‘rebranding’. This might be due to the fact 
that some ‘niche’ parties  among which RLPs  are penalized by voters if they pursue 
moderation vote-seeking strategies (cf. Adams et al. 2006) and may need to resort to 
organizational change to restructure their electoral coalitions. Future research could 
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illuminate whether existing trends towards more inclusive leadership selection processes, 
which have been shown to increase policy responsiveness to electoral demands (Lehrer 
2012), will make it easier for RLPs to adapt to changes in the electorate without the need to 
resort to organizational rupture.  
 
Additionally, our results suggest that policy change is effected in these parties through the 
incorporation of other ideological/cleavage dimensions. It might well be that RLPs stick to 
their overall positions on the traditional economic left-right dimension but that a number of 
them still (1) change how they frame this position — e.g. by reducing their use of Marxist 
and anti-imperialist references or less frequently invoking nationalizations — and/or (2) they 
adopt new issues that are still somewhat correlated to the left-right dimension but clearly 
belong to a different one (e.g. the GAL/TAN dimension), thus responding to the preferences 
and movements of the public over time. This opens an avenue to further research into the 
strategies of non-mainstream parties to adapt to social and electoral changes in ways that go 
beyond just moving along the left-right dimension.  
 
The second set of implications for existing and future research is related to the need to more 
systematically consider the sources of variation in the classification of the policy and 
ideological positions of political parties, in general, and RLPs in particular. On the one hand, 
there are a number of cases  the PCF in 2002 and 2007, the KKE in 1996, Syriza since the 
mid-1990s, PRC in 1996, SP in 2006 and 2010, PCP/CDU since 1999  for which the CMP 
data and the CHES evaluations yield different results in relation to their inclusion of New 
Politics issues. Future research should strive to illuminate which  if any  are the 
systematic sources of such disparity of findings. Are they, perhaps, due to the fact that some 
RLPs are not emphasising in the manifestos these issues as much as they are in their daily 
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political actions and statements  which are better captured by expert judgements  as 
suggested by Adams et al. (2012)? Or are they reflecting an underlying true lukewarm or 
ambivalent commitment to these issues by certain RLPs? 
 
On the other hand, although our typology of RLPs partially matches existing classification 
efforts in the literature, there are ways in which the study of the ideological differences 
among RLPs could be further expanded. In this regard, an interesting expansion of the 
research agenda reported in this article could consider more systematically the over-time 
evolution of RLPs in their ideological and policy positions. Are there linear trends in the 
incorporation of New Politics issues within and across parties? Additionally, even though 
recent classifications of RLPs have introduced a ‘populist’ dimension (March 2011, Pauwels 
2014), the nature of the CMP and CHES data did not allow us to identify items that could 
potentially capture this underlying dimension. Thus, future research could focus on whether 
different degrees of populism can be found among RLPs and how we can best measure these 
ideological traits. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1. List of radical left parties in Western Europe. 
Country Party/ies 
Austria KPÖ - Communist Party of Austria 
Cyprus AKEL - Progressive Party of Working People 
Denmark SF - Socialist People Party (until 2012), EL - Red Green Alliance 
Finland VAS - Left Alliance 
France* PCF - French Communist Party  
Germany Die Linke - The Left (previously PDS - Party of Democratic Socialism) 
Greece 
Syriza - Coalition of the Radical Left (previously SYN - Progressive Left Coalition); KKE - 
Communist Party of Greece 
Iceland VG – Left Green Movement (previously Ab - People's Alliance) 
Ireland SP - Socialist Party; DL - Democratic Left; WP - Workers' Party 
Italy 
RC - Communist Refoundation; PdCI - Party of the Italian Communists; PCI - Italian Communist Party 
(until 1991); PdUP - Party of Proletarian Unity  
Luxembourg Déi Lénk – The Left 
Netherlands SP - Socialist Party 
Norway 
SV - Socialist Left Party (previously SF - Socialist People's Party, and NKP - Norwegian Communist 
Party) 
Portugal 
CDU - Unitary Democratic Coalition (or PCP - Communist Party of Portugal), BE -Left Bloc 
(previously UDP - Democratic Popular Union) 
Spain IU - United Left (previously PCE - Communist Party of Spain) 
Sweden V - Left Party (previously VPK - Left Party - The Communists) 
Switzerland PdAS - Party of Labour 
 * Worker’s Struggle (Lutte Ouvrière, LO) and the Revolutionary Communist League/New Anti-capitalist party 
(Ligue Communiste Revolutionnaire/Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste) are, unfortunately, not covered by the 
sources. 
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Table 2. Variables from the CMP employed in the analyses. 
Issues that empirically distinguish RLPs from other 
parties   
Name (New Politics issues marked as NP in brackets) 
Ratio of mentions by RLPs / mentions by 
others 
Marxist analysis 12.8 
European community: negative 6.3 
Nationalisation 5.8 
Military negative 4.2 
Anti-imperialism 3.6 
Labour groups positive 2.7 
Controlled economy 2.4 
Opposition to internationalism  2.1 
Peace positive [NP] 2.1 
National way of life: negative 1.8 
Foreign special-relationships: negative (e.g. Anti-US) 1.7 
Social justice 1.7 
Economic planning  1.7 
Democracy [NP] 1.6 
    
Other New Politics issues added   
    
Internationalism: positive 0.9 
Underprivileged minority groups 1.2 
Anti-growth economy 1.3 
Environmental protection 1.1 
Traditional morality: negative 1.3 
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Table 3. Factor analysis of RLPs’ positions using CMP data (n = 250). 
Variable 
Factor 1  
(New Politics) 
 
Variable  
Factor 2  
(Anti-Imperialist 
Orthodoxy) 
Environmentalism + 0.6879 Democracy + -0.4356 
Internationalism + 0.5503 Anti-imperialism + -0.4337 
Foreign special + -0.3672 Foreign special + 0.4325 
Anti-growth economy + 0.3603 Military + 0.3346 
Peace + -0.3275 Economic planning + 0.2943 
Social justice + 0.3245 Peace + 0.2663 
Internationalism - -0.2836 Marxist analysis + -0.2553 
Minority groups + 0.2664 Europe - 0.2326 
Anti-imperialism + -0.2655 Social justice + 0.1935 
Military + -0.2359 Internationalism - -0.1243 
Traditional morality - 0.193 Labour + -0.1012 
Labour + -0.185 Controlled economy + 0.0981 
Economic planning + -0.1549 Internationalism + 0.0936 
Democracy + -0.1171 Minority groups + -0.0833 
Nationalization + -0.1014 Traditional morality - -0.0692 
National way of life - -0.0715 Environmentalism + 0.0595 
Marxist analysis + -0.0671 Nationalization + 0.0354 
Controlled economy + 0.0484 Anti-growth economy + 0.0157 
Europe - 0.026 National way of life - -0.009 
Note: we highlight the variables that load highest in each factor. Variables are rank-ordered according 
to their factor loading on each dimension. 
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Figure 1. Position of RLPs on the New Politics and the anti-imperialist orthodoxy dimensions 
using CMP data. 
 
 
Note: Positive values indicate more New Politics positions on Dimension 1, whereas negative values denote 
more Anti-Imperialist positions on Dimension 2. 
Legend: The party cases combine the country identifier (e.g. EL), the party case (e.g. 1) and the election year 
(e.g. 96). The country and party codes are as follows: AT (Austria): 1 = KPO; CH (Switzerland): 1 = PDAS-
PDTS; CY (Cyprus): 1 = AKEL; DE (Germany): 1= PDS, 2 = Die Linke; DK (Denmark): 1= EL; 2=SF; EL 
(Greece): 1 = KKE, 2 = SYN, 3 = Syriza; ES (Spain): 1 = IU; FI (Finland): 1 = VAS; FR (France): 1 = PCF; IE 
(Ireland): 1 = UL, 2 = WP, 3= DL, 4 = SP; IS (Iceland): 1 = VGF, 2 = Ab; IT (Italy): 1 = PRC, 2 = PdCI; LU 
(Luxembourg): 1 = PCL-KPL, 2 = Left; NL (Netherlands): 1 = SP; NO (Norway): 1=SV; PT (Portugal): 1 = BE, 
2 = PCP; SE (Sweden): 1 = V.  
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Figure 2. Location of RLPs in the left/right and New Politics axes according to the Chapel 
Hill expert surveys. 
 
Note: Both axes represent the average positions of each RLP per year as estimated by the experts. The economic 
left/right position in the horizontal axis is extracted from variable LRECON of the CHES, which locates parties 
exclusively on their stances on economic issues, with values ranging between 0 (extreme left = wanting the 
government to play an active role in the economy) and 10 (extreme right = emphasizing a reduced economic 
role for government). The New Politics position on the vertical axis is extracted from variable GALTAN of the 
CHES, which locates parties in terms of their stances on democratic freedoms and rights, with values ranging 
between 0 (libertarian or postmaterialist parties) and 10 (traditional or authoritarian parties). See Bakker et al. 
(2012) for further details. 
Legend: The party cases combine the party identifier and the election year. BE = Left Bloc (Portugal); CDU = 
Democratic Unitarian Coalition (Communist Party of Portugal); EL = Red-Green Alliance (Denmark); IE_SP = 
Socialist Party (Ireland); IU = United Left (Spain); KKE = Communist Party of Greece; LINKE = The Left 
(Germany); Linkspartei/PDS = Party of Democratic Socialism (Germany); LO-LCR = Workers’ Struggle – 
Revolutionary Communist League (France); NL_SP = Socialist Party (Netherlands); PCF = Communist Party of 
France; PdCI = Party of the Italian Communists;  PdUP= Party of Proletarian Unity (Italy); RC = Communist 
Refoundation (Italy); SD = Democratic Left (Italy); SL = Left and Freedom (Italy); SYN = Coalition of the Left, 
Movements and Ecology (Greece); SYRIZA = Coalition of the Radical Left (Greece); V = Left Party (Sweden); 
VAS = Left Alliance (Finland). 
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Table 4. Classification of West European RLPs after 1980  
Country TRADITIONAL NEW LEFT 
Austria KPÖ  
Cyprus AKEL  
Denmark EL; SF until 1990  SF since 1990 
Finland SKDL* VAS 
France PCF  
Germany 
 
Die Linke/PDS 
Greece KKE & Synaspismos/Syriza  
Iceland Ab until 1991** Ab 1991-1995, VG 
Ireland SP & WP DL 
Italy DP, PRC until 1994, PdCI until 2006 PRC since 1994 & PdCI since 2006  
Luxembourg Déi Lénk until 1989 Déi Lénk since 1989 
Netherlands SP  
Norway  SV 
Portugal PCP & UDP*** BE 
Spain PCE/IU until 1989 IU since 1989 
Sweden V until approx. 1982 V since approx. 1982 
   
Source: Own classification using the CMP and CHES datasets. Notes: parties in shade are the ones for 
which this classification differs from that proposed by previous literature. * Finnish People’s Democratic 
League, Suomen Kansan Demokraattinen Liito, is the antecedent party of VAS (founded in 1990). ** 
Alþýðubandalagiðws (Ab) was the antecendt party of Vinstrihreyfingin – grænt framboð (VG), Left-
Green Movement (founded in 1999). *** União Democrática Popular, People’s Democratic Union, was 
one of the parties that later created the BE.  
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Figure 3. Predicted probabilities of voting for Traditional and New Left RLPs for the variables with 
significant effects in Table A3. 
 
Note: Figures on the y axis are population-averaged probabilities based on Table A3.  
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APPENDIX  
Figure A1. Screeplot of the factor solution for RLPs ideological dimensions 
 
Source: MRG/CMP data of the 19 items listed in Table 2, using all RLPs for all years in the 
dataset. 
 
Table A1. Distribution of the categories of the dependent variable. 
Vote N Percent Cum. 
Non RLP 74,709 93.28 93.28 
Traditional RLP 3,457 4.32 97.60 
New Left RLP 1,921 2.40 100 
Total 80,087 100 
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Table A2. Classification of RLPs  as New Left by CMP and CHES data and years covered by 
the data. 
Country Party Year 
New 
Left in 
CMP? 
New 
Left in 
CHES? 
Defined as New Left 
in our analyses? 
Austria KPO 2002 no n/a no 
Austria KPO 2008 no n/a no 
Cyprus AKEL 1996 no n/a no 
Cyprus AKEL 2001 no n/a no 
Germany Linke 1990 yes n/a yes 
Germany Linke 1994 yes n/a yes 
Germany Linke 1998 yes yes yes 
Germany Linke 2002 yes yes yes 
Germany Linke 2005 no yes yes 
Germany Linke 2009 yes yes yes 
Germany Linke 2013 yes n/a yes 
Denmark EL (VS) 1981 no n/a no 
Denmark EL (VS) 1984 no n/a no 
Denmark EL 1987 n/a n/a no 
Denmark EL 1988 n/a n/a n/a 
Denmark EL 1990 n/a n/a n/a 
Denmark EL 1994 no n/a no 
Denmark EL 1998 no yes no 
Denmark EL 2001 no n/a no 
Denmark EL 2005 yes yes no 
Denmark EL 2007 no yes no 
Denmark EL 2011 no n/a no 
Denmark SF 1981 no n/a no 
Denmark SF 1984 no n/a no 
Denmark SF 1987 no n/a no 
Denmark SF 1988 no n/a no 
Denmark SF 1990 yes n/a yes since 1990 
Denmark SF 1994 yes n/a yes since 1990 
Denmark SF 1998 yes yes yes since 1990 
Denmark SF 2001 yes yes yes since 1990 
Denmark SF 2005 yes yes yes since 1990 
Denmark SF 2007 yes yes yes since 1990 
Denmark SF 2011 yes n/a yes since 1990 
Spain IU (PCE) 1982 no n/a no 
Spain IU (PCE) 1986 no n/a no 
Spain IU 1989 yes n/a yes since 1989 
Spain IU 1993 yes n/a yes since 1989 
Spain IU 1996 yes yes yes since 1989 
Spain IU 2000 yes yes yes since 1989 
Spain IU 2004 yes yes yes since 1989 
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Country Party Year 
New 
Left in 
CMP? 
New 
Left in 
CHES? 
Defined as New Left 
in our analyses? 
Spain IU 2008 yes yes yes since 1989 
Spain IU 2011 yes yes yes since 1989 
Finland VAS (SKDL) 1983 no n/a no 
Finland VAS (SKDL) 1987 no n/a no 
Finland VAS 1991 yes n/a yes since 1991 
Finland VAS 1995 no n/a yes since 1991 
Finland VAS 1999 yes yes yes since 1991 
Finland VAS 2003 yes yes yes since 1991 
Finland VAS 2007 yes yes yes since 1991 
Finland VAS 2011 no n/a yes since 1991 
France PCF 1981 no n/a no 
France PCF 1986 no n/a no 
France PCF 1988 no n/a no 
France PCF 1993 no n/a no 
France PCF 1997 no no no 
France PCF 2002 no yes no 
France PCF 2007 no yes no 
Greece KKE 1981 no n/a no 
Greece KKE 1985 no n/a no 
Greece KKE 1989 n/a n/a 
 Greece KKE 1990 n/a n/a 
 Greece KKE 1993 no n/a no 
Greece KKE 1996 no yes no 
Greece KKE 2000 no no no 
Greece KKE 2004 no no no 
Greece KKE 2007 n/a n/a no 
Greece KKE 2009 n/a no no 
Greece SYR (SYN) 1985 n/a n/a n/a 
Greece SYR (SYN) 
1989 
(nov) no n/a no 
Greece SYR 1990 no n/a no 
Greece SYR 1993 n/a n/a no 
Greece SYR 1996 no yes no 
Greece SYR 2000 no yes no 
Greece SYR 2004 no yes no 
Greece SYR 2007 n/a n/a no 
Greece SYR 2009 n/a yes no 
Ireland DL 1992 yes n/a yes 
Ireland DL 1997 yes n/a yes 
Ireland SP 1997 . yes no 
Ireland SP 2011 no n/a no 
Ireland WP 
1982 
(nov) no n/a no 
Ireland WP 1987 no n/a no 
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Country Party Year 
New 
Left in 
CMP? 
New 
Left in 
CHES? 
Defined as New Left 
in our analyses? 
Ireland WP 1989 no n/a no 
Italy DP 1983 no n/a no 
Italy PCI 1983 no n/a no 
Italy PCI 1987 yes n/a no 
Italy PdCI 2001 no n/a no 
Italy PdCI 2006 yes yes yes since 2006 
Italy PdCI 2008 n/a yes yes since 2006 
Italy PRC 1992 no n/a no 
Italy PRC 1994 yes n/a yes since 1994 
Italy PRC 1996 no yes yes since 1994 
Italy PRC 2001 yes yes yes since 1994 
Italy PRC 2006 yes yes yes since 1994 
Italy PRC 2008 n/a yes yes since 1994 
Luxembourg Left (PCL-KPL) 1984 no n/a no 
Luxembourg Left (PCL-KPL) 1989 yes n/a yes since 1989 
Luxembourg Left (PCL-KPL) 2004 n/a n/a yes since 1989 
Luxembourg Left 2009 yes n/a yes since 1989 
Netherlands SP 1994 n/a n/a n/a 
Netherlands SP 1998 n/a no no 
Netherlands SP 2002 yes yes no 
Netherlands SP 2003 yes n/a no 
Netherlands SP 2006 yes no no 
Netherlands SP 2010 yes no no 
Portugal BE (UDP) 1980 no n/a no 
Portugal BE (UDP) 1983 no n/a no 
Portugal BE (UDP) 1985 no n/a no 
Portugal BE (UDP) 1987 no n/a no 
Portugal BE 1991 n/a n/a n/a 
Portugal BE 1995 n/a n/a n/a 
Portugal BE 1999 yes yes yes since 1999 
Portugal BE 2002 no n/a yes since 1999 
Portugal BE 2005 yes yes yes since 1999 
Portugal BE 2009 yes yes yes since 1999 
Portugal BE 2011 no n/a yes since 1999 
Portugal PCP 1980 no n/a no 
Portugal PCP 1983 no n/a no 
Portugal PCP 1985 no n/a no 
Portugal PCP 1987 no n/a no 
Portugal PCP 1991 no n/a no 
Portugal PCP 1995 no n/a no 
Portugal PCP 1999 no yes* no 
Portugal PCP 2002 no yes* no 
Portugal PCP 2005 no yes* no 
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Country Party Year 
New 
Left in 
CMP? 
New 
Left in 
CHES? 
Defined as New Left 
in our analyses? 
Portugal PCP 2009 no yes* no 
Portugal PCP 2011 no n/a no 
Sweden V (VKP) 1982 yes n/a yes at least since 1980s 
Sweden V (VKP) 1985 yes n/a yes at least since 1980s 
Sweden V (VKP) 1988 yes n/a yes at least since 1980s 
Sweden V 1991 yes n/a yes at least since 1980s 
Sweden V 1994 yes n/a yes at least since 1980s 
Sweden V 1998 yes yes yes at least since 1980s 
Sweden V 2002 yes yes yes at least since 1980s 
Sweden V 2006 no yes yes at least since 1980s 
Sweden V 2010 yes yes yes at least since 1980s 
Switzerland PdA 2007 no n/a no 
Iceland Ab 1983 no n/a no 
Iceland Ab 1987 no n/a no 
Iceland Ab 1991 yes n/a yes since 1991 
Iceland Ab 1995 yes n/a yes since 1991 
Iceland VG 1999 yes n/a yes since 1991 
Iceland VG 2003 yes n/a yes since 1991 
Iceland VG 2007 yes n/a yes since 1991 
Iceland VG 2009 no n/a yes since 1991 
Norway SV 1981 yes n/a yes at least since 1980s 
Norway SV 1985 no n/a yes always since 1980s 
Norway SV 1989 yes n/a yes always since 1980s 
Norway SV 1993 yes n/a yes always since 1980s 
Norway SV 1997 yes n/a yes always since 1980s 
Norway SV 2001 yes n/a yes always since 1980s 
Norway SV 2005 yes n/a yes always since 1980s 
Norway SV 2009 yes n/a yes always since 1980s 
* CHES data refer to the electoral platform CDU (PCP + Greens) 
n/a = not available 
    Grey cells indicate that party and election are covered by the EES data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 44 
Table A3. Multinomial multilevel models of RLP voting 
 
  
Other party  
v Traditional RLP (ref)   
New Left RLP 
v Traditional RLP (ref) 
 
RRR (S.E.) RRR (S.E.) 
Age 1.01*** (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
Male 0.97 (0.05) 0.99 (0.09) 
Education (reference= up to 14 years) 
    
Education 15–18 1.54*** (0.12) 1.86*** (0.24) 
Education 19–20 1.81*** (0.19) 2.04*** (0.35) 
Education 21+ 1.24** (0.10) 1.96*** (0.27) 
Working-class identity 0.74*** (0.05) 1.12 (0.11) 
Union member 0.64*** (0.04) 0.91 (0.09) 
Living in big city or suburbs 0.74*** (0.04) 1.03 (0.10) 
No religion 0.66*** (0.04) 1.60*** (0.16) 
Left–Right self-placement (1–10) 1.93*** (0.03) 1.12*** (0.03) 
Very dissatisfied with democracy 0.65*** (0.04) 1.53*** (0.14) 
EU membership bad for country 0.38*** (0.03) 0.52*** (0.64) 
Intercept 1.49*** (0.21) 0.08*** (0.02) 
N (individuals) 41,212 
13 N (countries) 
Log likelihood -8048.99 
Coefficients are relative-risk ratios (with standard errors in brackets).  
The variance for the random component of the comparison “Other Party v Traditional RLP” is 1.57 (s.e. = 0.08); 
the variance for the random component of the comparison “New Left RLP v Traditional RLP” is 1.14 (s.e. = 
0.07). The covariance between the random effects is -0.69 (s.e. = 0.09). 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01 
Source: EES, 1989-2009 
 
 
